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ABSTRACT
Nitrate  contamination  of municipal  and  domestic  well water  supplies  is becoming  an in-
creasing problem in many rural  and urban  areas, raising the cost of providing safe drinking
water.  The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  describe  a  marketable  permit  scheme  that  can
effectively manage nitrate pollution of groundwater supplies for communities in rural areas
without  hindering  agricultural  production  in  watersheds.  The  key  to  implementing  this
scheme  is being  able to link nitrate leaching  from nitrogen  fertilizer  applied  to crops  at a
farm  to nitrate levels measured  at  a drinking  water well.
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Nitrate  contamination  of municipal  and  do-
mestic  well water supplies  is becoming  an in-
creasing  problem in many rural and urban  ar-
eas, raising the cost of providing safe drinking
water.  A  well-water  survey conducted  by the
U.S.  Environmental  Protection  Agency (EPA)
found nitrates in over half of community water
wells and  almost 60 percent of rural domestic
wells  in  the  U.S.  (Environmental  Protection
Agency).  Nitrate  contamination  of water may
pose  a  threat  to  human health',  which  would
likely result in additional  cleanup costs to pro-
tect  health.  Treating  the  drinking  water  con-
tamination  problem  can  add  several  hundred
dollars per year to the household cost of main-
taining  private  wells  and  from  $2  to  almost
$50  per  year  to  the  household  water  bill  in
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1These  include  methemoglobinemia  (blue-baby
disease) in infants  and gastric cancer in  adults  (Wall).
larger  municipal  systems  (O'Neil and  Rauch-
er).
Sources  of nitrates  in the  groundwater  in-
clude  commercial fertilizers for crops, manure,
septic  systems,  lawn  fertilizers,  feedlots,  and
municipal and industrial  waste (Wall). Though
agricultural  production  practices  are  clearly
only  one  of  many  sources  of  nitrates  to
groundwater,  they  can  be  a  significant  source
in  farming  areas  where  nitrogen  fertilizer  is
heavily  applied to  crops.  Excess  nitrogen not
used  by  the  crops  has  the  potential  to  leach
below the root zone into groundwater.  Because
agriculture is believed to be a substantial con-
tributor  to  nitrate  pollution  in  groundwater,
and  because  the  consistency  of  agriculture
planting  methods  lends  itself  to  quantitative
analysis,  this paper focuses on the implemen-
tation of a tradable  permit scheme  at the farm
level.
The objective  of this paper is to describe a
marketable  permit scheme that can effectively
manage  nitrate  pollution of groundwater  sup-
plies  for communities  in  rural  areas  withoutJournal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2000
hindering  agricultural  production  in  water-
sheds.  The  key  to  implementing  this  scheme
is being  able  to link nitrate  leaching  from ni-
trogen  fertilizer  applied  to  crops  at  a farm  to
nitrate  levels  measured  at  a  drinking  water
well.  The  proposed  approach  is  feasible  be-
cause  soil models  can predict  nitrate  leaching
losses  from  the  crop  root  zone  and  contami-
nant transport models  can  simulate  movement
of nitrates in groundwater  systems. When soil
and  groundwater  processes  are  linked,  each
farm's  contribution  to  nitrate  contamination
levels  at groundwater  wells  can  be estimated.
This  means  that  each  farm  can  be  held  ac-
countable  for  its  specific  portion  of  contami-
nation,  thus  converting  nitrate  contamination
of groundwater  from  a nonpoint-source  prob-
lem to a point  source  problem.
Traditionally, nitrate  groundwater pollution
has been  analyzed  as  a nonpoint-source  prob-
lem, a realistic approach  given the lack of data
relating nitrogen application to leaching. How-
ever,  this informational  gap  is diminishing  as
site-specific  data is becoming  accessible, both
as raw data from field experiments  and as out-
put from models developed to simulate nitrate
transport  through  the  crop  root  zone.  Several
studies  have  integrated  sample  or  simulated
nitrate  leaching  data into  an economic frame-
work to  evaluate  the effect  of regulatory  op-
tions  designed  to  reduce  groundwater  pollu-
tion (Fleming; Mapp et al.).
A few  studies  have included  the biophysi-
cal  processes  of  leaching  to  examine  the
effectiveness  of  leachate  permits  (Pan  and
Hodge;  Thomas).  However,  the  permits  in
these studies  are  traded  based  on the quantity
of nitrates estimated  to enter the groundwater,
not  nitrate  levels  at  groundwater  wells.  It  is
more relevant to  assess nitrate  levels at a well
(rather  than  nitrate  loadings  into  the  ground-
water)  using a water quality  test performed on
a sample  of groundwater  taken  from the  well.
Health  impacts  from  nitrates  are  directly  re-
lated  to  individuals  in  the community  ingest-
ing contaminated  drinking  water.
Nitrate leaching elevates the ambient (over-
all)  concentration  of  nitrates  in  the  ground-
water but may have a greater or smaller impact
on nitrate levels  at wells used to supply drink-
ing  water.  Basing  damages  to  drinking  water
on  leaching  from  agricultural  production  im-
plicitly  ignores  the location  of the production
with respect  to the  well.  As  a consequence,  a
farm's production activities may have substan-
tial  effects  on  a  well  due  to  its proximity  to
the well, even though its effect on overall  am-
bient  quality  is  no  different  from  any  other
farm's production in  the area.
Determining  well  contamination  levels  re-
quires  incorporating  the  geologic  and  hydro-
logic  data  of  an  aquifer  into  the  model.  Hy-
drogeologic  characteristics  and  groundwater
flow of the aquifer determine  how nitrates will
affect  various  wells  once  in  the groundwater.
A  tradable  permit  scheme  which incorporates
this  type  of data  would  allow  permits  to  be
traded  based  on  final  well contamination  lev-
els rather than on initial nitrate leaching levels.
The two forms of environmental regulation
to  be  discussed  in  this paper  are  direct regu-
lation,  referred  to  as  command-and-control
(CAC),  and  permit  trading.  Direct regulation
is  simply  a  uniform  abatement  agricultural
practice that meets the nitrate standard  at wells
imposed  on  all  farms  in  the community  by  a
regulatory  authority.  Permit  trading,  on  the
other hand, relaxes the homogeneity constraint
and  allows  farms  in  the  community  to  trade
permits to  achieve  the same  standard.
Economist have long argued that incentive-
based  mechanisms,  such  as  the  marketable
permit  system,  are  more  efficient  than  direct
regulatory  approaches.  These  arguments  are
based on the assumption that a marketable per-
mit system can  achieve the same environmen-
tal quality standard  as direct regulation,  but  at
a lower cost,  since polluters have flexibility in
how  they  go  about  achieving  the  specified
emission target. The empirical evidence for air
pollution  suggests  that  permit  systems  have
the  potential  to  generate  large  cost  savings
while  inducing  significant  reductions  in  air
pollutants  as  compared to  standards  (e.g.,  At-
kinson  and Lewis;  McGartland  and Oates).
In order to evaluate the effectiveness  of the
CAC and permit-trading regimes at controlling
nitrate  contamination  of groundwater,  the link
from surface application of nitrogen to nitrates
at  a  targeted  well  needs  to  be  established.
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While it is conceptually easy to monitor nitrate
accumulation  at  a  targeted  well,  it  is  much
more difficult  to model the physical processes
that  deliver  those  nitrates  to  the  well.  How-
ever, if groundwater regulatory  policies are to
be constructive  in controlling  nitrates it is im-
portant  to be able to predict how much of the
nitrogen  applied  on  the  surface  leaches  into
groundwater  and the subsequent transport and
accumulation  at  the well.
Models
This section describes  the production,  soil and
groundwater models used to make the connec-
tion  between  agricultural  production  and  ni-
trate  levels  at a  well.  In  order  to evaluate  the
effectiveness  of  the  regulatory  models,  farm
level  and  regional  data  is  needed  to  predict
profits  (and  abatement  costs)  for  production
practices, nitrate  leaching  resulting from these
production  practices,  transfer  coefficients,  and
the  accumulation  of  nitrates  at  groundwater
wells.  The  integrated  model  used to  complete
this task is  a composite of three distinct mod-
els:  production,  soil,  and  groundwater.  Each
model represents  one level  in the nitrate  con-
tamination process that results  in nitrates  at  a
targeted well.
The  production  model  is designed  to  cap-
ture  management  responses,  in  terms  of the
choice  of crop  rotation  and  nitrogen fertilizer
(N) application rate,  to regulatory  policies tar-
geted at  reducing  leaching  and,  subsequently,
nitrate  levels  in  groundwater.  Representative
crop  rotations  and nitrogen management  prac-
tices  are  portrayed  in  the  production  model.
The  crop  rotation  and the nitrogen  applied to
crops in this rotation are a production practice.
The  nitrates  from  these  production  practices
may  leach into the groundwater.  To determine
the level of leaching, the crop rotation and the
nitrogen  applied  to  crops  in  that rotation  are
entered into the soil model which predicts  wa-
ter  and  nitrogen  leaching  from the root  zone.
Results  from the  soil  model  for each  produc-
tion  practice  are then entered  into the ground-
water  model  which  simulates  nitrate  move-
ment  and  accumulation  at  the  targeted  well.
The essence  of the integrated model is provid-
ed in detail in the following three sections, one
for each  model.
Production  Model
The production  model  should capture  all pro-
duction practices available to farms in a study
area.  There are numerous production practices
available  to  farms,  even  within  a  single  crop
rotation,  since many different rates of nitrogen
can be applied to crops in that rotation.  In the
production model, profits would be established
for  the  crop  rotations.  Important  components
of  profits  for  the  rotations  are  yields.  Crop
yield  generally  varies  with  nitrogen  fertilizer.
To capture  the relationship  between crop yield
and  N  fertilizer,  a  crop-yield  function  can  be
estimated.  Legumes,  such  as  soybean  and  al-
falfa, are often used as rotation crops. Because
legumes  fix  their  own  nitrogen,  they  do  not
require  fertilization.  Yield  estimates  for these
crops  can be obtained  from the  soil model.
Profits  vary  by  production  practice  as
yields  for the  crops  in  rotation  change.  With
regulation,  the  most  profitable  production
practices may  not be feasible for the area  sur-
rounding  the well because  nitrate leaching un-
der  these  practices  results  in  nitrate  levels  at
the well exceeding the standard. In these cases
the area may  have to engage in less profitable
production practices in order to meet the stan-
dard. The difference between  the optimal pro-
duction  practice  and  a  less profitable practice
is the abatement  cost associated  with reducing
nitrates  at the targeted  well.
Crop  production  under  any  of the produc-
tion  practices  may  involve  contamination  of
the  groundwater in  the  underlying  aquifer  by
nitrate leaching from the root zone of the crop.
Nitrate  leaching  varies by  crop  type,  nitrogen
application  rate,  weather,  and  soil  character-
istics.  The  soil  model,  which  is  discussed  in
the next section,  can be used to predict nitrate
leaching for  each production  practice.
Soil Model
The  soil  model  described  in  this  paper is the
Groundwater Loading Effects of Agricultural
Management  Systems  (GLEAMS)  model,
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which  simulates  the hydrology,  soil chemistry
and  crop  growth  of  agricultural  fields.  The
GLEAMS  model  is used to predict the fate  of
nitrogen  in  the  root  zone  depending  on  agri-
cultural management  practices.  Nitrogen in the
root  zone  may  be  chemically  transformed
(mineralization,  denitrification),  taken  up  by
the plant,  leached from the root zone or remain
in  the profile.  These  processes  are  detailed  in
the  nutrient component  of GLEAMS.
GLEAMS  divides  the  plant  root  zone  ef-
fective  for water  and nutrient uptake  into 3  to
12  layers,  depending  on  the  depth  and  thick-
ness  of the  soil horizon.  GLEAMS  simulates
nitrate  movement  through  the  soil  profile  by
calculating  nitrate transfer  through  each layer.
Nitrates  in  the  first  (surface)  layer  are  either
lost  to  surface  runoff  or  percolated  down  to
the next  layer.  Runoff nitrate  is  a  function  of
the nitrate  concentration  in  the water  and the
runoff amount.  Nitrates  which  percolate from
any layer to an underlying layer depend  on the
nitrate concentration  in that layer and the wa-
ter percolated  into  the underlying layer.
GLEAMS  also  calculates  other factors  in-
cluding  nitrogen  mineralization,  immobiliza-
tion,  and  nitrification2,  which  can  change  the
nitrate concentration  in each layer.  The  model
keeps track  of nitrate mass  in each layer.  Per-
colated water  and nitrates from the lowest lay-
er  are  assumed  to  be  the  loadings  to  the
groundwater  from  the root  zone.  A  more  de-
tailed  description  of the GLEAMS  model  can
be found in the  user manual  (Knisel).
The input for the GLEAMS  model includes
regional  climate  data  such  as  precipitation,
temperature,  and solar radiation, in addition to
crop  and  nitrogen management  practices.  Soil
properties  needed  for  the  simulation  include
the silt,  sand,  and clay content  of the soil, po-
rosity,  organic  matter,  and field  capacity.  The
GLEAMS  model  should be validated by com-
paring  predicted  values  with  measured  field
data from  an agricultural site.  Once calibrated,
2 Mineralization  is the  process  where organic  N  is
converted  to inorganic  N,  the  form used by  crops,  by
bacteria  in  the  soil.  Immobilization  is the  process  by
which N is tied up by bacteria and not readily available
for  the  plant.  Nitrification  is  the  conversion  of  am-
monium nitrogen  to nitrate  nitrogen.
GLEAMS  can  be used to predict nitrate load-
ings  for different  crops  and nitrogen  applica-
tion rates.
Groundwater Model
The  groundwater  model  described  in this  sec-
tion  is  the  U.S.  Department  of  Defense
Groundwater Modeling  System (GMS), which
simulates  flow  and  contaminant  transport  in
groundwater.  The  system  was  developed  by
the  Engineering  Computer  Graphics  Labora-
tory  of Brigham  Young  University  in  coop-
eration  with  the  U.S.  Army  Corps  of  Engi-
neers Waterways  Experiment Station.  GMS  is
a  comprehensive  groundwater  model  which
supports  other  existing  industry  models  and
provides  for  the  sharing  of  information  and
data between  different  models.
GMS  provides  an  interface  to the  ground-
water  flow model,  MODFLOW,  and the  con-
taminant  transport  model,  MT3D.  MOD-
FLOW  is  a  three-dimensional,  cell-centered,
finite-difference,  saturated-flow  model capable
of  both  steady-state  and  transient  analyses.
MT3D  is  a  modular  three-dimensional  trans-
port  model  that simulates  contaminant advec-
tion,  dispersion,  and  chemical  reactions  in
groundwater3. MT3D is typically  used in con-
junction with a MODFLOW simulation.  Flow
values computed  during  a  MODFLOW  simu-
lation  are  used  by  MT3D  during  the  flow
phase  of  the transport  simulation.  These  two
models, when put together, provide  a compre-
hensive  tool for examining  groundwater  flow
and nitrate  transport and accumulation.
A  MODFLOW  model  can  be  constructed
for a  site to be studied.  A  detailed description
of the site which includes the location of wells
and  pumping  rates,  the  boundary  of the  do-
main  to be  modeled,  recharge  zones,  and lo-
cation of rivers  and streams  would  be needed
3 The two main  mechanisms  that determine  how a
contaminant  is transported  in  groundwater  are  advec-
tion  and  dispersion,  where  both  processes  depend
strongly on groundwater  flow. Advection  is the process
by  which  solutes  are  transported  by  the  bulk  flow  of
groundwater.  There  is also  the tendency  for the  solute
to spread  out  from the advective  path. This  spreading
phenomenon  is  called  dispersion  (Freeze and Cherry).
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for each  of the layers  of the aquifer.  A  three-
dimensional  grid can  be  created for the  mod-
eled area where each cell of the grid possesses
a unique  set of data used  to calculate ground-
water  flow  in the modeled area.
Two  Forms of Environmental Regulation
Although  the  efficiency  of the  permit  system
has  been  acknowledged  in  theory and  imple-
mented as control for air pollution (Montgom-
ery; Baumol  and Oates), this paper is believed
to be the first  attempt to outline  a method  for
implementing  a  marketable  permit  system  as
a  groundwater pollution  control  strategy.  The
key to  being  able  to conduct  this  analysis  for
groundwater  pollution  is  establishing  the
physical  relationship  between  (1)  the  surface
application of nitrogen  to a crop  rotation (pro-
duction)  and nitrate  leached  into  the  ground-
water  (soil)  and  (2)  the  location  of nitrogen
leached and its contribution to the nitrate level
at  the  targeted  well  (groundwater).  The  fol-
lowing  sections  discuss  how  these  relation-
ships  are used  to evaluate  the effectiveness  of
direct  regulation  and  permit  trading  for  im-
proving  nitrate  groundwater  pollution.
To facilitate  an understanding  of the com-
mand-and-control  and permit-trading  regimes,
a more formal  statement of the pollution  con-
trol problem in the context of agriculture pro-
duction and groundwater is outlined in the fol-
lowing  discussion.  Assume  that  within  the
watershed there  are  m receptors  (groundwater
wells). The environmental  quality standard for
nitrates at receptor j is denoted qj  (j  =  1, . . .
m).  Thus,  the  current  environmental  quality
can be described by a vector Q  =  (qj,  q2,  ...  ,
qm) whose elements indicate  the concentration
of nitrates  at each  receptor.  Within  the water-
shed there are k production practices available
to n farms,  where  a production  practice  refers
to  a type  of crop  rotation  and  nitrogen  fertil-
izer rate  applied to  crops  in  that rotation.  All
farms have the same set of production practic-
es  available  to  them.  Soil  types  and,  hence,
nitrate  leaching  from  these  soils  under  each
production  practice  are  assumed  to  be identi-
cal  across  n farms.  In other words,  farms  are
assumed  to  be  identical  with  respect  to  the
available  set  of production  practices  and  ni-
trate leaching into the groundwater from these
practices. The farms are different because their
locations  relative to the  well are  different.
The  dispersion  of  leachate  (or  nitrates)
from each of the n farms is given by a n  X m
matrix D:
where  dij  represents  the  increase  in  the  con-
centration  of nitrates  at  receptor  j  from  one
unit  of leachate,  e(ki),  from  production  prac-
tice,  k, by farm  i  (i  =  1,  . ..  n).  This  matrix
of transfer coefficients is given by the ground-
water  model.  Because  leaching  is  a  function
of the crop  planted, nitrogen fertilizer applied,
and rainfall,  the rate of water and nitrate leach-
ing  may  vary  over time  for  each  k.  Further-
more,  the nitrates  leached  into  the groundwa-
ter  may  reach  the  well  soon  or  it  may  take
years,  depending  on  the  rate  of  groundwater
flow.  As  a  result,  this  matrix  of transfer  co-
efficients  may  change  from  year  to year.  The
matrix  described  above  is for  a  fixed interval
in time,4 dictated by the rate of nitrate leaching
and  groundwater flow.  Hence,  farm i's contri-
bution  to  nitrates  at  well  j  from  production
practice,  ki,  at  this  fixed  time  is  equal  to
dije(ki),  where  e(ki) is the nitrates leached from
the soil into the groundwater from production
practice k for farm i, which is predicted by the
soil  model.
The  environmental  authority  of the region
determines  the set of standards  which  specify
the  maximum  allowable  contaminant  level  of
nitrates  at each  receptor point:  Q*  =  (q*,  q*,
... ,  q*).  In  the  case  of nitrates,  the  United
States  Environmental  Protection  Agency
(EPA)  has defined this  amount as  10 parts per
million  (ppm) or less for public  drinking  wa-
ter.  The  EPA  standard  of  10  ppm  is taken  as
the standard at each receptor point for both the
command-and-control  (CAC) regime  and per-
4 Because  it  may  take years  for nitrates  to  reach a
well,  a regulator  may  choose to target regulation for a
future  time  period.
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mit-trading  regime.  The  next  sections discuss
first  a  command-and-control  version  of envi-
ronmental regulation for groundwater  and then
add  a competitive  market  for permit trading.
Command-and-Control  Regime
Under  a  CAC  regime,  an  environmental  au-
thority  sets  the nitrate  standard  at each  recep-
tor,  Q*,  at  10 ppm.  It is  assumed  that the  au-
thority requires  that each farm adopt the same
production  practice,  k,  so  that the  sum  of ni-
trates  across  farms  meets  the  standard  of  10
ppm:  Sidije(ki)  <  q*.  In other  words,  the  en-
vironmental  agency  specifies a uniform  abate-
ment production practice for all farms contrib-
uting  nitrates  to a  well.  This  control  program
results  in  a  specific  vector  of  crop  rotations
and fertilizer  application.  In general  these uni-
form  CAC  systems  will  require  more control
over  the  region  than  is  required  to  limit  the
pollution  to  the  desired  level  at  the  receptor,
resulting  in excessive  costs.
Permit-Trading  Regime
Montgomery  was  the first  to formally  analyze
two  systems  of marketable  pollution  permits:
a  system  of  "pollution  licenses",  commonly
referred  to as an ambient permit system (APS),
which confers the right to deliver pollutants to
a  receptor  point,  and  a  system  of "emission
licenses"  referred  to  as  an  emission permit
system  (EPS)  which  grants  the  holder  of the
permit  the right to emit pollutants up to a cer-
tain rate.
The permit-trading  scheme to be examined
in  this  study  is  the  ambient  permit  system
(APS)  proposed  by Montgomery.  In  this  sys-
tem, a permit grants  the right to deliver a pol-
lutant to a specific  well. Each well has its own
market in permits specific  to that receptor. The
goal is  to achieve  the  predetermined  standard
at minimum  abatement  costs5. More  formally,
let e(k,)  be  the  current  rate  of leaching  from
5 Abatement cost  is  the loss in  profits from choos-
ing a less  optimal  production practice,  k.  It is assumed
that switching  a production practice  is the only activity
available  to a  farm to reduce  nitrate leaching.
production  practice,  k, for farm i.  If AC(ki)  is
the abatement  cost  associated with production
practice  k for  farm i, then the social  planner's
problem  under  the APS  is  to  find  the  vector
of production practices,  K =  (k,  ..  .. , k), that
represents  the solution  to the  following  prob-
lem:
minimize  E  AC(ki)
i
s.t.  E(K)D  <  Q* E >0.
where E(K)  =  (e(k,),  ...  e(k,)).
Farms are endowed  with a finite number of
permits  or  licenses,  10,  which  may  be  re-
deemed in  the present period  in exchange  for
the  right  to  deliver  one  unit6 of  nitrate  to  a
groundwater  well.  The  permit  market  de-
scribed  in  this  paper  is  an  auction  market
where  the regulator,  through  an  iterative pro-
cess,  finds  the  equilibrium  permit  price.  The
farms may trade these permits with one anoth-
er  at  price  p*,  the  equilibrium  price.  Farm  i
can  engage  in  trades  as  long  as  it  does  not
deliver more nitrates to receptor j than it holds
permits  for:  dije(ki)  <  lij,  where  lii  denotes  the
number  of permits held by farm i after trading
has occurred.
Because  permits are  defined  as the right to
deliver one  unit  of nitrates  to the well,  trades
occur  on  a  one-to-one  basis.  However,  each
permit  implies  a  different  allowable  nitrate
loading  rate  (i.e.,  a  different  production  prac-
tice)  into  the  groundwater  at  each  farm  be-
cause  of variations  among  the transfer  coeffi-
cients.  More  specifically,  farm  i has  to obtain
de(ki) permits at each receptor j. The compli-
ance cost of the APS to the farm is loss profits
plus  expenditure  on  permits,  p*(lij  - 1). Ex-
penditures  on permits may be positive or neg-
ative because they can be bought or sold. That
is,  the cost of compliance  to farm i,  Ci,  is
Ci =  ACi +  p*(lj, - 1i  )
where AC, is the abatement  cost incurred from
switching  from one production  practice,  k, to
6 Examples  of some  possible units  are  1 ppm,  0.1
ppm,  0.01  ppm  or 0.005  ppm.
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another.  If the  farm  sells  permits,  then  lij  <
1i  and compliance costs  are  lower.  For a farm
which  buys  permits,  li  >  1l and  compliance
costs  are  higher.  The  overall  compliance  cost
of the permit market is  Si Ci.
Nitrate  levels  resulting  from  current  (un-
regulated)  production practices,  with neither a
permit  nor  command-and-control  system  in-
cluded,  will  provide  a  means  to  evaluate  the
tradeoffs  between gains occurring through dif-
ferent types of environmental  policy interven-
tions.  Changes  in  farm  profits,  abatement
costs,  fertilizer application rates,  leaching, and
nitrate  concentrations,  in  the  overall  ground-
water  and  at  individual  wells,  resulting  from
the  introduction  of  the  different  regulatory
schemes  can  be compared.
The Application
Before  introducing  a  trading  scheme  at  the
farm level,  several  key components need to be
determined.  First,  for  any  modeled  area  the
wells  and farms  contributing  nitrates  to those
wells  would need to be identified.  For purpos-
es  of  discussion,  suppose  one  well  which  is
the  drinking water  source for  several  individ-
uals  is targeted  in  a  watershed.  The  area  sur-
rounding  this well is predominately  farm land,
consisting  of only  a few  farms.  The market in
this case is small with just a few potential trad-
ers.
After  identifying  the  well  and  farms,  a
planning  horizon  for the  trading  scheme must
be selected.  Historic  climate data may be used
to project  future nitrate leaching  for each pro-
duction practice.  The planning  period selected
must be  sufficiently  long  to capture  variations
and extremes  in weather,  thereby  demonstrat-
ing  how  year-to-year  fluctuations  in  precipi-
tation  affect leaching  and  nitrate levels  at the
targeted  well.  For  example,  in  drought  years
one  might  expect  GLEAMS  to  predict  little
measurable  leaching  and  GMS  to  show  little
change  in nitrates  in the  groundwater  for  the
weather  conditions  that  occurred  in  these
years.  However,  for  an  extremely  wet  year,
one  might expect  GLEAMS  to predict  signif-
icant leaching  and GMS to show higher nitrate
levels  in  the  groundwater.  Furthermore,
groundwater flow in aquifers is in general very
slow,  where  it may  take  several  years  for  ni-
trates  entering  the  groundwater  the  first  year
of  the  simulation  to  reach  the  targeted  well.
The  planning  horizon  should  be  sufficiently
long to allow observation of nitrate movement
and accumulation  at  the targeted  well.
Since  numerous  production  practices  are
available  to  farms  and  these  practices  may
change year to year over the planning horizon
depending  on harvested  crop  prices  and input
prices,  two  additional  simplifications  can  be
made  to  the  production  model  to  make  the
analysis more manageable.  The  first is that the
production  practice  initiated  in year  one by  a
farm does not change through the planning ho-
rizon.  Fixing  the production  practice  through
time, however,  does not fix nitrate leaching or
nitrate  movement  or accumulation  in ground-
water  (due  to  variability  in rainfall).  The  sec-
ond  assumption  is  that  profits  (or  abatement
costs)  do  not  change  through  time.  Annual
losses  incurred  from  switching  from  a  more
profitable  production  practice  to  a less profit-
able one in year one is the same for each year
of the planning  horizon.
However,  before  introducing  new  nitrates
into the groundwater,  it is important  to  deter-
mine how  nitrates  already  in  the groundwater
will impact  the  nitrate  level  at  the  well  over
the planning horizon.  This provides  a baseline
for comparison  in  evaluating  the effect of ad-
ditional  crop  production  over  time.  The  next
step  is  to  evaluate  how  engaging  in  farming
increases  nitrate  levels  at  the  well  over time.
As  the farming  area produces,  the nitrate level
at the well  may increase  over time  and could
exceed  10 ppm at some point during the plan-
ning  horizon.  The  goal  of  the  regulatory
schemes  is to force  farms to commit to a pro-
duction  practice  at  the  start  of  the  planning
horizon  to be  continued  for the  length of  the
planning horizon so that the nitrate level at the
well in  the last year  of the horizon  is  10 ppm
or less. Furthermore,  nitrate  levels  at the well
cannot  exceed  10  ppm  at  any  time  over  the
planning  horizon.
In order  for farms to make decisions  about
abatement  so  that  the  standard  is  met  under
APS,  transfer coefficients,  marginal abatement
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costs, and initial permit allocations are needed.
The transfer coefficient indicates the change  in
nitrate levels  at  the well from a  change in ni-
trate leaching  from  a shift  in production prac-
tices.  Marginal abatement  costs  are defined  as
the  change  in  abatement  costs  ($/acre)  for  a
given  change  in  nitrate  levels  (ppm)  at  the
well  resulting  from  a  shift  in  the production
practice.  Marginal  abatement  costs  are  abate-
ment  costs  for  a  production  practice  change
divided  by  the  transfer  coefficient  associated
with that change.  Farms are each given an  ini-
tial  endowment  of permits  at  the  start  of the
planning  horizon 7. They  can  trade  with  one
another  at  the  equilibrium price,  p*,  and  this
trade  can take  place  as  long  as  each farm has
enough permits to cover  its contribution to ni-
trates  at  the  well  after  the  trade.  Each  farm
would compare  its marginal abatement  cost to
p*  when  making  decisions  about  abatement
and  permit  trading.  The  process  to  find  p*  is
discussed  in the next  section.
The Trading Scheme
The  regulator  sets up  a  web  page that reports
the amount delivered  to the well for each farm
under each production practice.  Each farm has
access  to  its  dije(ki).  Assuming  an initial  dis-
tribution  of permits,  permit trading is allowed
within  the  farming  area.  Each  permit may  be
redeemed  in  year one of the planning horizon
in exchange  for the right  to deliver  0.01  ppm
of nitrate  to the  targeted  well  in the  last year
under  the  production  practice  chosen  for  the
planning  horizon.  Each  farm  is  a  price  taker
in the  permit market;  that is, it is assumed no
strategic  behavior  occurs  in the market.
On this web page an auctioneer posts a per-
mit  price,  p.  Each  farm  knows  its  marginal
abatement  cost  from switching  from one pro-
duction practice  to  another and the amount of
7 The  initial  distribution  of permits  among  farms
will not  affect the cost-effectiveness  of the permit sys-
tem to  the farming  area  as  long  as  the permit  market
is competitive (Montgomery).  However,  the initial dis-
tribution is important  because it will affect  the level of
compliance  costs  faced  by  each  farm  in  the  farming
area.  We assume  that a politically feasible distribution
of permits  will be  chosen.
nitrates at the well resulting from that practice.
Based  on  the posted  permit  price,  each  farm
must make a decision  about which production
practice  to adopt  for the planning  horizon and
the number of permits to buy or sell based on
its  contribution  to the nitrate  concentration  at
the well  under that production  practice.  If the
price of the permit is greater than the marginal
abatement cost associated with switching from
the  most  profitable  production  practice  to  a
less  profitable production  practice  for a  farm,
then  the  farm  would  abate  (switch)  and  sell
permits.  If the price of the permit is less than
the cost of switching,  then the farm would not
abate  and would  instead buy permits to cover
its contribution  to  the nitrate  concentration  at
the well under its optimal production practice.
Each farm logs onto the web page in March
of year  one, before  planting,  and  submits  its
optimal production practice and the number of
permits to  trade based  on  the price posted by
the  auctioneer.  The  auctioneer  requires  two
constraints  to  be  satisfied  under  all  the  pro-
duction practices  and permits submitted by the
farms. The first is that the nitrate concentration
at  the  well  does  not  exceed  10  ppm  at  any
point over  the planning  horizon for the  farm-
ing  area under  the production  practices.  If the
production  practices  for  the  farming  area  re-
sult  in  a nitrate  concentration  at  the well that
complies  with  the  standard,  then  the  second
requirement  is  that  the  market  for  permits
clears.  That  is,  the  supply  of  permits  equals
the  demand  for  permits.  The  optimal  produc-
tion  practice for  all farms is taken  as the trad-
ing baseline.  In other words, farms that reduce
nitrogen  leaching  further control more than  is
required and will have permits  to sell to other
farms.  Recall  that  a  permit  gives  the  holder
the right to deliver 0.01  ppm of nitrates to the
well,  and  these permits  are  traded  at  the  be-
ginning  of the planning  horizon based  on  ni-
trates delivered  to the well the last year of the
planning  horizon.
GLEAMS  calculates  nitrate  leaching  and
GMS calculates  the subsequent nitrate level at
the  well  under  each  production  practice  re-
quested by the farms  and for the farming area
as  a  whole.  The results  of  this  round  of  the
iteration  are  posted  on  the  web  page.  If the
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nitrate level  at the well exceeds  10 ppm at any
point over the planning horizon, the auctioneer
posts  another  permit  price.  If the standard  at
the well  is met under the combination  of pro-
duction  practices  but the  permit  market does
not clear,  the auctioneer posts a higher price if
there  is  excess  demand  or  a  lower  price  if
there is excess  supply  in the permit market.
Farms  submit  another  production  practice
and  permits  to  trade,  which  may  or may  not
be  different  from  its  predecessor,  depending
on  the posted  price.  This procedure  continues
until farms  submit a set of production practic-
es that achieves  the standard of  10 ppm at the
last year of the planning  horizon for the farm-
ing  area,  without  exceeding  10  ppm  at  any
point over the horizon and the market for per-
mits  clears.  It  is  assumed  that  farms  do  not
behave  strategically  when choosing  a produc-
tion practice;  that is,  farms  do  not make  side
payments  to  other farms  nor  do  they  act col-
lectively  against other farms.  Through this it-
erative  process  a  solution  can  be  found.  This
optimal solution would consist of an allocation
of  production  practices  defining  the  optimal
production  practices  chosen  by each  farm  af-
fecting  the well  at the  market-clearing  permit
price,  p*.  At  this  price  some  farms  would
choose  to  sell  permits  while  others  would
choose  to buy them.
Under  the CAC regime  the abatement  cost
(compliance  cost) is the same for each farm in
the  area  (because  the  production  practice  is
uniform  across  the  area).  Under  the  APS,
abatement  costs would be the greatest to those
farms  whose  nitrates  really  count  at  the well
(i.e.,  location  matters).  The  farms  closest  to
the well  have lower marginal  abatement  costs
and have the incentive to sell permits. The cost
of compliance may be offset by selling permits
to  farms  farther  away,  who  have higher  mar-
ginal abatement  costs.
The  total  compliance  cost  associated  with
the post-trade allocation would be determined,
and  this  cost  would be  compared  to  the  cost
of the CAC regime to  determine  the potential
cost savings generated by permit trading at the
market-clearing  price.  The difference  between
the total  compliance  costs  of the two regimes
would  be the total cost  savings.  As studies in
the  air  pollution  literature  have  shown,  the
permit-trading  system  is  more  cost  efficient
compared  to the CAC regime.  If the cost sav-
ings  of  the  permit  system  prove  to  be  quite
large  relative  the  CAC regime  in the  case  of
groundwater  pollution,  then an APS can be an
efficient  strategy  for reducing  nitrate  contam-
ination of groundwater  resulting from agricul-
tural  practices.
Conclusions
While  applying  N  may  increase  crop  yield
within  a crop  rotation,  and a  farm's profits,  it
may  also  result  in  an  increase  in  nitrates
leached into  the  groundwater  and  subsequent
nitrate  accumulation  at  a well.  An increase  in
nitrates  in  wells  may  lower  drinking  water
quality  and thereby impose health risks to cur-
rent and  future  consumers  of this  well  water.
To ensure that the nitrate  standard  at the well
is achieved year  after  year,  regulation may be
needed  to  encourage  farms  to  adopt  produc-
tion  practices  that  limit  leaching  and  nitrate
accumulation in groundwater and at wells. The
objective  of  this  paper  was  to  describe  two
regulatory  policies,  specifically  a permit mar-
ket scheme and the benchmark  command-and-
control  scheme,  for  controlling  nitrate  levels
at a  well at  the farm level.
The  costs imposed by the alternative forms
of  environmental  regulation  on  the  farms
would  depend  upon  the  production  practice
adopted  by  a farm,  location  of that farm with
respect to  the well,  and the  direction  and rate
of  groundwater  flow.  Different  assumptions
concerning  production  practices  can  be  used
to  evaluate  the  performance  of the CAC  and
APS  in  terms of cost  savings.  The  CAC  sys-
tem  requires  that  each  farm  adopt  the  same
production practice  so that the nitrate standard
at  the well at  the end of the planning  horizon
is achieved.  The APS accounts for information
on  transfer  coefficients  which  indicates  how
the  nitrate  contribution  to the  well  differs  by
a  farm's  location  relative  to  the  well.  Given
the  price  of  an  ambient  permit  each  farm
would choose a production practice  so that the
total  nitrate  contribution  by  the farming  area,
with  each  farm  adopting  its  optimal  practice
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at  that price,  would  not  exceed  10  ppm  over
the  planning  horizon  and  the  permit  market
clears.
Three  distinct  models-production,  soil
and  groundwater-are  used  to  establish  the
connection  between  nitrogen  applied  on  the
surface  to nitrates at the well. Each model rep-
resents  one  step  in  the  process  that  leads  to
nitrates  at  the  well.  In  the  production  model
each  farm adopts  a production  practice-crop
rotation and nitrogen application rate. The pro-
duction  practice  is  entered  into  GLEAMS,
which predicts  water percolation  and the level
of  nitrates  leached.  Predicted  water  and  ni-
trates  leached for each production  practice are
entered  into  the  MODFLOW  and  MT3D  in-
terfaces  of  GMS,  respectively.  The  ground-
water  simulations  indicate  the  nitrate  contri-
bution  at the well.  This methodology converts
the  contamination  problem  from  a  nonpoint
source  to  a  point-source  problem,  and  illus-
trates  the  importance  of  incorporating  tools
from other disciplines  to initiate new  avenues
of  economic  research  on  the  problem  of
groundwater  contamination  from  agricultural
production.  With  these  tools  a  regulator  is
equipped to determine the  ambient nitrate lev-
el in groundwater  and the nitrate level at wells
resulting  from  agricultural  production practic-
es.
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